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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is vested in the Court of Appeals pursuant to an Order of the Utah 
Supreme Court transferring jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals under the authority of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(4) (1953, as amended). A copy of the Order is set forth in 
the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err in its interpretation of the Declaration? 
The interpretation of a contract presents a question of law. Therefore this Court 
will review the trial court's interpretation for correctness, granting no deference to the 
trial court's conclusion. Fairbourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2004 
UT 54, % 6, 94 P.3d 292. 
This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 259. 
2. Did the trial court err in concluding that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact precluding an award of summary judgment to Wendy's? 
In reviewing a grant or denial of summary judgment, the Court is obligated to 
view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party and to review the trial court's legal conclusions, as well as the 
grant of summary judgment as a whole, for correctness. Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 
2004 UT 85 ffl[ 2, 10, 100 P.3d 1200. 
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This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 259. 
3. Did the trial court err in determining that the new signs constructed by 
Wendy's on Parcel Three are authorized by the Declaration? 
The interpretation of a contract presents a question of law. Therefore this Court 
will review the trial court's interpretation for correctness, granting no deference to the 
trial court's conclusion. Fair bourn Commercial, Inc. v. Am. Hous. Partners, Inc., 2004 
UT 54,16, 94 P.3d 292. 
This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 259. 
4. Did the trial court err in determining that the Plaintiffs' trespass and breach 
of contract claims were barred by the statute of limitations? 
The Court will review this question giving no deference to the decision of the trial 
court and reviewing it to determine whether the trial court's decision was clearly 
erroneous. Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City, 2004 UT App 436, 104 
P.3d 646. 
This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 259. 
5. Did the trial court err in enjoining the Plaintiffs from taking any action to 
interfere with Wendy's use of the drive-through facilities located on Plaintiffs' property? 
2 
This issue presents a mixed question of fact and law. This Court will review the 
trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. Because the facts were determined in the 
context of a Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court will view the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. 
Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85 ffi[ 2, 10, 100 P.3d 1200. 
This issue was preserved for review in the Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. R. at 259. 
6. Did the trial court err in awarding attorneys' fees to Wendy's? 
An award of attorneys' fees is discretionary with the trial court and will therefore 
be reviewed by this Court to determine if the trial court committed patent error or if the 
award constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, 130 P.3d 
325. 
This issue was preserved for review in the Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Affidavit and Award of Attorneys' Fees. R. at 352. 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56 
The full text of these statutes and rules is set forth in the Addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Defendant/Appellee Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, 
Inc. ("Wendy's") owns the real property located at 3259 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah (the "Wendy's Property"), on which is located a restaurant building and related 
improvements. R. at 119, f 1. 
2. The Wendy's Property is adjacent to the Canyon Rim Shopping Center (the 
"Shopping Center"), which is owned by Plaintiffs/Appellants (hereinafter "Plaintiffs"). 
R. at 119,^2. 
3. Both the Wendy's Property and the Shopping Center are included in the 
property described in a Declaration, which was recorded in the office of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder on September 24, 1982 as Entry No. 3714292, in Book 5410, at Page 
823. A copy of the Declaration is included in the Addendum to this brief. R. at 119, ^ f 3. 
4. The Declaration identifies three distinct parcels of property within the 
property described therein. The Wendy's Property is located within what the Declaration 
refers to as "Parcel Three." R. at 119, ^ J 5. 
5. The Wendy's Property was developed as a Burger King restaurant in or 
about 1982. R. at 120,16. 
6. At the time the Burger King restaurant was constructed on the Wendy's 
Property in or about 1982, a drive-through lane was also constructed on the north side of 
the Wendy's Property. The drive-through lane is bounded on the north by a narrow, 
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landscaped island edged with concrete curbing, and on the south by the restaurant (the 
drive-through lane and related island are referred to hereinafter as the "Drive-Through 
Facilities"). Rat 120, f 7. 
7. The Drive-Through Facilities extend from the northwest comer of the 
restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto the Plaintiffs' property. 
R. at 80, If 11. 
8. The Plaintiffs' property which is encumbered by the Drive-Through 
Facilities is identified in the Declaration as "Common Area" of the Shopping Center. R. 
at 80, f 11. 
9. The Declaration contains an Exhibit A, referred to as the Plot Plan. The 
Plot Plan is a proposed site plan for the Canyon Rim Shopping Center. R. at 79, f^ 6. 
10. The Plot Plan shows the Drive-Through Facilities as two curved lines 
running from the northwest comer of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to 
the northeast. R. at 7. 
11. With respect to Parcel Three, the Declaration provides that "[n]o building 
featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be located on Parcel Three, 
except as shown on the Plot Plan . . . . " R. at 38. 
12. The physical relationship between the location of the Wendy's building and 
the Drive-Through Facilities as shown on the Plot Plan is not consistent in scale with the 
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physical location of the Wendy's building and Drive-Through Facilities as physically 
located on the ground. R. at 280, ^ 8. 
13. The Wendy's building, as built, begins approximately 8 feet ± farther from 
the North edge of the 33rd South right-of-way and is approximately 13 feet longer than 
the building shown on the Plot Plan. R. at 280, f 9. 
14. With respect to signage on Parcel Three, the Declaration states that: 
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to construct 
two (2) free-standing pylon, monument or other signs at the 
location designated on the Plot Plan as "Parcel Three Sign." 
No other pylon, monument or other free-standing sign shall 
be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior written 
approval of all Owners . . . . 
R. at 39, 40. 
15. In November, 2002, Wendy's became aware that the Drive-Through 
Facilities then being operated by Burger King encroached upon Plaintiffs' property 
through a survey commissioned by Wendy's and performed by Larsen & Malmquist. R. 
at 151, <h 3; 261, f 1. 
16. Shortly thereafter a representative of Wendy's contacted Mark Papanikolas 
to inquire about purchasing an easement over Plaintiffs' property. R. at 261, f^ 2. 
17. In December, 2002, Plaintiffs notified Wendy's that Plaintiffs would not 
allow drive-through facilities to be located on Plaintiffs' property without compensation 
being paid to Plaintiffs. R. at 261, ^ 3. 
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18. On or about February 28, 2003, Wendy's purchased the Burger King 
Restaurant property located at 3259 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah and converted 
the restaurant from a Burger King to a Wendy's. R. at 262, f^ 4. 
19. Following the purchase by Wendy's of the Burger King property, Wendy's 
replaced the Burger King free-standing signs and added additional free-standing and 
monument signs, at least one of which was constructed on Plaintiffs' property, and a new 
fence. R. at 2624 5; 2871. 
20. Wendy's is currently maintaining the drive-through facilities and 
landscaped area as shown on the Larsen & Malmquist survey to be on Plaintiffs' property 
and has planted and continues to maintain flowers, shrubs and grass on Plaintiffs' 
property, together with one of Wendy's signs. R. at 262, f^ 6. 
21. In addition to a pylon sign along 3300 South at the south end of the 
Wendy's Property, and a directional sign located on the Drive-Through Facilities, 
Wendy's also constructed two additional menu-board signs on the Wendy's Property (the 
"Menu-Board Signs"). R. at 254, U 5, 283, ^  8-9. 
22. The Declaration provides that in the event legal proceedings are brought to 
enforce any provision of the Declaration as against any party with an interest in the 
property described therein, "the successful party in such action shall then be entitled to 
1
 Page 287 of the Record is a photograph which clearly shows a rod-iron fence along the 
western boundary of Parcel Three, extending onto Plaintiffs' property. It is obvious this 
was constructed by Wendy's as the Larsen & Malmquist survey, located at page 8 of the 
Record, identifies a chain-link fence at the same location. 
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receive and shall receive from the defaulting owner or party a reasonable sum as 
attorneys' fees and costs to be fixed by the Court in the same action." R. at 47. 
23. In July, 2004, Plaintiffs filed suit against Wendy's alleging trespass and 
breach of contract based on the location of Wendy's Drive-Through Facilities on 
Plaintiffs' property. R. at 1. 
24. Wendy's brought a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' claims 
and on Wendy's counterclaims on September 30, 2005. R. at 114. 
25. A hearing was held on Wendy's motion on December 12, 2005. R. at 306. 
26. On December 12, 2005, the Court entered a Minute Entry, granting 
Wendy's Motion for Summary Judgment. A copy of the Minute Entry is included in the 
addendum to this brief. In the Minute Entry the Court states: 
After reviewing the record in this matter, as well as the 
applicable Utah law, the Court finds the proper focus in a 
statute of limitations analysis is the time at which the cause of 
action accrued, not the identity of the parties involved. See 
Utah Dep't of Envlt. Quality v Redd, 2002 UT 50, ^ 16, 48 
P.3d 230 {citing Utah Code Ann., § 78-12-1). While the 
Plaintiffs' suggest the trespass is continuing, rather than 
permanent and, therefore, their lawsuit is timely, the Court 
disagrees. At issue in this case is a landscaped island edged 
with concrete curbing, which is considerably more permanent 
than the pile of "rocks, soil, and other debris" which 
constituted the act of trespass contested in Brieggar 
Properties, L.C v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 1953, p. 
11, 52 P.3d 1133. This said, it is undisputed the alleged 
trespass and breach of the Declaration occurred in or about 
1982 and, consequently, the causes of action are time barred. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is granted. Defendant is asked to prepare 
the appropriate affidavit of fees and submit the same for 
consideration by the Court. 
R. at 307. 
27. On January 9, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal. R. at 314. 
28. Notwithstanding the Court's direction in its December 12, 2005 Minute 
Entry to submit the "appropriate affidavit of fees," on January 17, 2006, Wendy's 
submitted proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, a proposed Final Judgment 
and an Affidavit of Costs and Fees. R. at 384, 321. 
29. On January 25, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Voluntary Notice of Dismissal of 
their Appeal. R. at 359. 
30. On January 27, 2006, Plaintiffs filed an Objection to Proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Affidavit and Award of Attorneys Fees. R. 
at 352. 
31. On March 21, 2006, the Court entered a Minute Entry finding Plaintiffs' 
objections to the Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and 
Affidavit and Award of Fees to be "without merit." A copy of the Court's Minute Entry 
is included in the Addendum to this brief. R. at 373. 
32. The Court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Final 
Judgment in this matter on March 21, 2006. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and the Final Judgment are included in the Addendum to this brief. R. at 375. 
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33. This appeal followed. R. at 397. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There are two fundamental issues in this matter. The first is whether the trial court 
correctly interpreted the Declaration which governs the parties' rights and obligations 
relating to the property at issue. The second issue is whether or not Plaintiffs' claims are 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On both issues, the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment to Wendy's was erroneous. 
In its interpretation of the Declaration, the trial court reached the conclusion that 
the Drive-Through Facilities currently being used by Wendy's were constructed in 
accordance with the Declaration. The plain language of the Declaration requires some 
subjective application of fact to the language of the Declaration to determine whether or 
not the improvements and facilities at issue were constructed in accordance with the 
Declaration. The trial court, despite the existence of completely contradictory affidavits 
from the parties, determined on summary judgment that the improvements, as built, were 
authorized by the Declaration. This determination was in error and requires reversal. 
On the statute of limitations question, the court determined that Plaintiffs' breach 
of contract and trespass claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The 
trial court found that the trespass at issue was permanent, as opposed to continuing 
within the meaning of Utah law. However, the court's determination rests on a faulty 
analysis and understanding of the relevant and applicable case law and mischaracterizes 
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the trespass as permanent when it is actually continuing. It also ignores undisputed facts 
presented in affidavits and other evidence that demonstrated that Wendy's installed 
additional improvements on Plaintiffs' property within the period of the relevant statute 
of limitations. 
Finally, it should be noted that while the court found that Plaintiffs' trespass and 
breach of contract claims were barred, it also found that Wendy's had trespassed on 
Plaintiffs' property. It then concluded that, notwithstanding the fact that Wendy's had 
trespassed, the improvements which constituted the trespass were permitted by the 
Declaration. This obviously inconsistent Judgment requires reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
DECLARATION AUTHORIZES MAINTENANCE AND USE OF THE 
DRIVE-THROUGH FACILITIES AS THEY CURRENTLY EXIST. 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in this matter, under the 
heading "Conclusions of Law," the trial court determined: 
9. Although the Declaration generally forbids the 
construction of improvements on common areas, it 
expressly authorizes Drive Through Facilities located on 
Parcel Three as shown on the Plot Plan. 
10. The Drive Through Facilities are consequently excepted 
from the Declaration's general prohibition of 
improvements on the Common Area and are, in fact, 
expressly permitted. 
11. Because the Drive Through Facilities are expressly 
permitted by the Declaration, Wendy's is entitled to a 
11 
declaratory judgment decreeing that the Drive Through 
Facilities may remain in use in their present location and 
configuration. 
R. at 380. Whether noted as a finding of fact or conclusion of law, this particular 
determination of the trial court is in error as it is completely inconsistent with the actual 
terms of the Declaration. Additionally, it was determined by the Court on a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and there were material facts at issue which, under the relevant law, 
precluded the Court's grant of summary judgment to Wendy's. 
A. The Trial Court's Interpretation of the Declaration was Incorrect. 
The rights of the parties to this matter regarding the use of the property at issue 
are generally set forth in a Declaration of Restrictions and Grant of Easements which was 
considered and reviewed by the trial court. That document is set forth at pp. 27-58 of the 
Record. Paragraph VI. A. sets forth restrictions relating to the property and provides, in 
part: 
No building featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through 
traffic shall be located on Parcel Three, except as shown on 
the Plot Plan, without the prior written consent of the Owner 
of Parcel Two and ASPI, including consent to the location of 
the drive-in, drive-up or drive-through lanes of such facility. 
R. at 38. Thus, the actual location of its building and the Drive-Through Facilities for the 
Wendy's Restaurant on Parcel 3 are at issue. 
The construction of the Declaration in this matter is a question of law. Covey v. 
Covey, 2003 UT App 380 f 16, 80 P.3d 553. Additionally, Utah Courts have noted that 
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the basic rule of contract interpretation is that in interpreting a contract, the intentions of 
the parties are controlling, and the court is required to give effect to the meaning intended 
by the parties at the time they entered into the agreement. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. 
Hardy, 2005 UT App 92 f 12, 110 P.3d 168. Finally, a contract should be interpreted so 
as to harmonize all of its provisions and all of its terms, which terms should be given 
effect if it is possible to do so. LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857 (Utah 
1988). The trial court determined that the Declaration's statement about the location of a 
building on Parcel Three allowed the construction, maintenance and exclusive use of 
drive-through facilities on Plaintiffs' property, not on Wendy's property. This 
determination was erroneous as a matter of law. 
First, there is not a single word in the Declaration that would allow the Drive-
Through Facilities serving the use on Parcel Three to be constructed anywhere other than 
on Parcel Three. Wendy's claim relies completely on the Plot Plan attached to the 
Declaration. That plan shows, at best, a sliver of a portion of the drive-through to overlap 
onto Plaintiffs' property. However, nowhere on the Plot Plan is any of the landscape 
buffer for the drive-through shown as being on Plaintiffs' property, nor does it show 
anything close to the magnitude of the encroachment of the drive-through lane itself onto 
Plaintiffs' property. In addition, even if a small portion of the drive-through lane were 
allowed by the Declaration to encroach on Plaintiffs' property, the Declaration does not 
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contemplate that the owner of Parcel Three would have exclusive use of the Plaintiffs' 
property, or any use without reasonable compensation being paid to Plaintiffs. 
The trial court's determination is very difficult to understand in light of the 
evidence in the Record. A copy of the Plot Plan is included in the Record at p. 52. In 
addition to the Plot Plan, there are two surveys provided for the property which show the 
actual location, as constructed, of the building and the Drive-Through Facilities on the 
property at issue. Those surveys are included in the Record at pp. 156 and 158. The 
surveys clearly show that the actual encroachment of the Wendy's Drive-Through 
Facilities is significantly greater than the very minor encroachment suggested on the Plot 
Plan and includes the entire width of the drive-through lane and the landscaped island on 
the northern edge. The Drive-Through Facilities on Parcel Three were not constructed as 
shown on the Plot Plan. 
B. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Precluded the Court's Award of 
Summary Judgment. 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
(emphasis added). It is well settled law that if there are any genuine issues of material 
fact, summary judgment is inappropriate. Lovendahl v. Jordan School Dist, 2002 UT 
130, 63 P.3d 705. In fact, Utah courts have gone so far as to state: "it only takes one 
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sworn statement under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy 
and create an issue of fact." Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975), W. 
M. Barnes Company v. Sohio Natural Resources Company, 627 P.2d 56, 58-59 (Utah 
1981). 
In this case, the trial court apparently accepted the opinion of the Defendant's 
witness Randy Smith, which was submitted via affidavit. However, Plaintiffs had 
submitted a contrary opinion in the affidavit of Mark Babbitt. These contrary opinions on 
the issue of whether or not the Wendy's drive-through was constructed "on Parcel 
Three," "as shown in the Plot Plan" create a genuine issue of material fact. 
The Affidavit of Randy D. Smith submitted by Wendy's, states: 
8. The "Plot Plan" appended as Exhibit "A" to the 
declaration shows the building now owned by Wendy's 
located in the southwest corner of Parcel Three and also 
shows, by two curved lines located just off the 
northwest corner of the Wendy's building, the drive 
through facility which serves the Wendy's building. 
9. It is my professional opinion that the curved lines on the 
Plot Plan depict a drive through facility in the same 
location as the drive through facility that is shown on 
the LMI Survey and the B&G Surveys and which 
currently serves the Wendy's restaurant. 
10. The Plot Plan is labeled as "Proposed Site Plan," which 
is indicative of a preliminary layout, not an as [sic] 
constructed drawing or a survey. The physical 
relationship, however, between the location of the 
restaurant building and drive through as shown on the 
Plot Plan is fully consistent in scale with the physical 
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location of the building and drive through facility as 
physically located on the ground. 
R. at 152. In response to the opinion of Mr. Smith, the Plaintiffs produced an affidavit 
from Mr. Babbitt, who is also a professional engineer. In his affidavit, Mr. Babbitt does 
not simply draw conclusions, as Mr. Smith did, but sets forth detailed measurements from 
an actual physical inspection of the property based upon one of the ALTA surveys as 
referenced in the Record. Based upon his examination of the survey and his actual 
physical inspection of the property, Mr. Babbitt testified in his affidavit as follows: 
8. The Plot Plan is labeled as "Proposed Site Plan," which 
is indicative of a preliminary layout, not as a 
constructed drawing or a survey. The physical 
relationship between the location of the restaurant 
building and drive thru as shown on the Plot Plan is not 
consistent in scale with the physical location of the 
building and drive thru facility as physically located on 
the ground. 
9. The dimensions I have listed in Items 4 and 7 above, 
although only approximate, show a significant 
difference in the location of the building and the drive 
thru window access. The building on Exhibit A is 30 
feet ± from the North right-of-way line versus 38.3 feet 
on the survey. The building in Exhibit A is 
approximately 64 feet long versus 76.9 feet on the 
survey. The North property line in Exhibit A is 
approximately 46 feet from the building versus 25.2 feet 
in the survey. The North edge of the access for the drive 
thru window in Exhibit A angles to the Southwest and is 
from 2 feet to over 10 feet closer to Wendy's north 
property line than the access shown on Wendy's survey. 
Approximately 480 square feet of the access lane shown 
on the Larsen Survey is North of the North edge of the 
access lane shown on Exhibit 'A'. 
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R. at 280-281. (emphasis added) 
Clearly, Mr. Babbitt's conclusions were completely opposite from Mr. Smith's. As such, 
Mr. Babbitt's affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the court's 
determination that the Drive-Through Facilities were constructed as shown on the Plot 
Plan was inappropriate on summary judgment. As a result, the court's award of 
Summary Judgment to the Defendant was contrary to the standards of Utah law. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE NEW SIGNS 
CONSTRUCTED BY WENDY'S ON PARCEL THREE ARE 
AUTHORIZED BY THE DECLARATION. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter, the trial court 
determined: 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
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The court further rejects plaintiffs' contention that the 
Declaration prohibits Wendy's from maintaining Menu 
Board Signs. 
The Declaration prohibits any "pylon, monument or 
other free-standing sign" on Parcel Three in addition to 
the pair of free standing signs expressly permitted 
thereby. The Declaration, however, does not prohibit 
Menu Board Signs. 
Moreover, the Declaration expressly contemplates and 
permits the operation of a drive through restaurant on 
Parcel Three. Signage like Menu Board Signs is an 
inherently necessary feature of modern drive through 
restaurants. 
Wendy's is entitled to a declaratory judgment decreeing 
that the Menu Board Signs may remain in use in their 
present location and configuration. 
R. at 380-381. This determination of the trial court is contrary to the express, written 
terms of the Declaration and is incorrect as a matter of law. 
Section VII of the Declaration deals specifically with signage, wherein it states: 
The Owners of Parcels One and Two shall have the right to 
construct from time to time any sign or signs it deems 
advisable on its parcels. 
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to construct 
two (2) free-standing pylon, monument or other signs at the 
location designated on the Plot Plan as "Parcel Three Sign." 
No other pylon, monument or other free-standing sign shall 
be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior written 
approval of all Owners andASPL 
R. at 39-40. (emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that in addition to the two pylon signs located on Parcel Three, 
Wendy's has constructed two free standing Menu-Board Signs on Parcel Three. R. at 
122. These signs were constructed without asking for or obtaining any approval, written 
or otherwise. However, notwithstanding this fact, the trial court concluded that the new 
signs constructed on Parcel Three by Wendy's are not in violation of the express terms of 
the Declaration. Utah law on construction of contracts requires that "[e]ach contract 
provision is to be considered in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving 
effect to all and ignoring none." Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-1062 
(Utah 1981). The trial court's conclusion could only be reached by ignoring the express 
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terms of the Declaration. At the very least, a factual issue exists as to the meaning of the 
terms, thus precluding the award of summary judgment. 
Additionally, the court's Finding of Fact No. 12 completely misstates the 
Plaintiffs' position. Plaintiffs have never argued that the Declaration prohibits Wendy's 
from maintaining Menu-Board Signs. The fact is the Declaration expressly allows any 
sign, including menu-board signs, so long as they are either: (1) attached to the interior 
or exterior of Wendy's building, or (2) Wendy's receives written permission from the 
other Owners and ASPI to install additional free standing signs. R. at 39, 40. It was 
Wendy's who chose not to either install its menu-board signs on the exterior of its 
building or seek permission from the other owners to install free standing menu-board 
signs. Accordingly, the trial court's determination on this point was in error. 
The trial court also accepted Wendy's invitation to construe the Declaration, 
contrary to its express terms, to allow its signs because they are "essential to the 
operation of drive-thru restaurants." (See R. at 255, f 6.) This request is contrary to Utah 
law. Utah courts will not construe a contract to include a provision or covenant which is 
contrary to the contract's express terms. 
In the case of Oakwood Village, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 104 P.3d 
1226, the Utah Supreme Court rejected a plaintiffs argument that the well-established 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be applied to a contract in a manner that 
was inconsistent with express contractual terms. The trial court's award of summary 
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judgment violates this principle. Here, to imply that a provision in the Declaration 
allowing a drive-through restaurant on Parcel Three somehow trumps the express 
contractual provision relating to signs on Parcel Three is contrary to this long-established 
principle of Utah law. In Dalton v. Jerico Construction Company, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
Even if the terms of the contract entered into in 1971 between 
Healy and Jerico may not have been profitable to Dalton 
when they were incorporated into the Dalton-Jerico contract 
in 1973, it is not for a court to rewrite a contract 
improvidently entered into at arm's length or to change the 
bargain indirectly on the basis of supposed equitable 
principles. 
642 P.2d 748, 750 (Utah 1982) 
The Court reached a similar result in Biesinger v. Behunin, wherein it stated: 
Persons dealing at arm's length are entitled to contract on 
their own terms, without the intervention of the Courts for the 
purpose of relieving one side or the other from the affects of a 
bad bargain. Id. p. 803. 
584 P.2d 801, 803 (Utah 1978). 
At the time the Declaration was signed, the Declarants expressly agreed to the number of 
signs that would be allowed on Parcel Three without the written permission of the other 
owners and ASPI. Such express language is not subject to interpretation. In short, two 
signs means two signs, not three, four or any other number needed for the convenience or 
profitability of Wendy's business. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS' TRESPASS AND BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS 
WERE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The trial court in this case determined that both Plaintiffs' trespass and breach of 
contract claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. On the trespass 
claims, the court's decision improperly characterizes the nature of the trespass. On the 
breach of contract claims, the court's decision ignores undisputed facts that clearly show 
acts undertaken within the statute of limitation period by Wendy's in violation of the 
Declaration. 
A. Plaintiffs5 Trespass Claims are not Barred by the Statute of 
Limitations. 
The court in this case concluded that "the alleged trespass is permanent and has 
been so since 1982," and therefore, Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the three year statute 
of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1). In reaching this determination, 
the court determined that the trespass at issue is a "permanent" trespass, as opposed to a 
"continuing" trespass as referenced in the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in 
Breiggar Properties, L. C. v. H. E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 53 52 P.3d 1133.. The 
trial court's determination on this point is contrary to the policy and rationale underlying 
the Breiggar decision. 
In Breiggar, the defendant, in the course of a road construction project, had 
mistakenly dumped a load of waste material, including soil and rocks, on the plaintiff's 
property. The plaintiff discovered the trespass some months after the actual act had 
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occurred. There is no indication in Breiggar that defendant or defendant's agents or 
invitees continued to use the property or that there was an ongoing deposit of material on 
the plaintiffs property after a date certain. Instead, it appears that waste material was 
dumped on plaintiffs property and defendants thereafter did not enter plaintiffs 
property. 
Upon discovering the trespass, the plaintiff demanded that defendant remove the 
material and negotiations ensued. However, for some unexplained reason, plaintiff did 
not file its action until some months after the three year statute of limitation had passed. 
In its opinion, the Utah Supreme Court carefully explained the distinction between 
a permanent and a continuing trespass. The Court noted: 
We characterize a trespass as "permanent" to acknowledge 
that the act or acts of trespass have ceased to occur. We 
characterize a trespass as "continuing" to acknowledge that 
multiple acts of trespass have occurred, and continue to 
occur, and that, in the event the statute of limitations has run 
on prior acts of trespass, recovery will only be allowed for 
those acts which are litigated in a timely fashion. 
By classifying acts of trespass in this manner, we give full 
effect to the intent of the Utah Legislature in adopting a three 
year statute of limitations for trespass. 
To hold otherwise by, for example, adopting a reasonable 
abatability test as advocated by Breiggar, would allow a 
plaintiff to bring a complaint against any trespasser - even if 
the act of trespass occurred decades earlier - as long as the 
harm caused by the trespass could be reasonably abated. Such 
a view would clearly undermine the purposes behind statutes 
of limitations. 
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Breiggar, 2002 UT 53, f 11, 13, 52 P.3d 1133. As noted in the memoranda submitted in 
the trial court, after Wendy's purchased the property in February, 2003, it tore down the 
Burger King signs and installed its own signs including at least two additional signs, and 
installed a new fence that encroaches on Plaintiffs' property, and planted shrubbery, 
flowers and a tree on Plaintiffs' property. R. at 262, 287. Additionally, in contrast to the 
situation in Breiggar, in this case employees and patrons of Wendy's continue to trespass 
on Plaintiffs' property every day and continue to utilize the Plaintiffs' property for 
Wendy's sole and exclusive purposes. Agents of Wendy's maintain the property and 
patrons utilize the drive-up window, to the exclusion of the property from its common 
area purpose, as established in the Declaration. This is in stark contrast to the one 
isolated act which occurred in Breiggar. 
Plaintiffs do not contest the trial court's finding that the improvements installed 
by Burger King on the Plaintiffs' property are "more permanent" than those at issue in 
Breiggar. However, the permanency of the trespass, under the rationale as set forth in 
Breiggar is not dispositive of whether the trespass is "continuing" or "permanent." 
Instead, it is the ongoing nature of the intrusion onto the Plaintiffs' property by Wendy's 
that should characterize Wendy's acts of trespass. Focusing solely on the "permanence" 
of the initial trespass is more in line with the adoption of a "reasonable abatability" test 
which was explicitly rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. In this case, the trespass is 
obviously continuing rather than permanent. 
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It should also be noted that contrary to the actions of the Plaintiff in Breiggar, in 
this case the construction of a new sign, a new fence and landscaping was not unknowing 
and inadvertent, but was done with specific knowledge that Wendy's was, in fact, 
trespassing. Additionally, Plaintiffs in this case did not wait beyond the three year statute 
of limitations to file their action, but filed almost immediately after Wendy's trespassed 
on Plaintiffs' property. Given the obvious distinctions between Breiggar and the case at 
issue, the trial court's determination that the trespass in this case was permanent as 
opposed to continuing was clearly wrong. 
However, even if this Court were to accept that the original construction of Drive-
Through Facilities on the property was a point in time from which the trespass claim 
should be measured, construction of the new fence, the installation of additional 
landscaping, and the placement of a Wendy's sign on Plaintiffs' property clearly 
constitutes an additional act of trespass. The trial court's complete disregard of this point 
is flatly wrong and, in and of itself, warrants reversal of the summary judgment. 
B. Plaintiffs' Breach of Contract Claims are not Barred by the Statute of 
Limitations. 
A similar analysis is applicable to the statute of limitations determination on the 
breach of contract claims. Clearly, the additional actions of Wendy's, in replacing one 
free standing menu board, installing an additional free standing menu board sign and 
installing a sign and fencing on Plaintiffs' property constitute new acts in breach of the 
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Declaration. Therefore, the Court's determination on the statute of limitations question as 
applied to the breach of contract claims is also incorrect as a matter of law. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S INJUNCTIVE ORDER IS INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE DECISION ON THE TRESPASS CLAIMS AND IS IN ERROR. 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in this matter, the court 
concluded: 
Wendy's is further entitled to an Order enjoining Plaintiffs 
from taking any action to inhibit Wendy's from using and 
maintaining the drive through facilities and menu-board signs 
in their present location and configuration. 
R. at 381. In the Final Order, the court ordered: 
Plaintiffs are hereby enjoined from taking any action to 
inhibit Defendant from using and maintaining the drive 
through facilities and menu-board signs in their present 
location and configuration. 
R. at 385. 
The trial court made the conclusion noted above and ordered as it did despite the 
fact that it had earlier determined that the location of the Drive-Through Facilities 
constituted a "permanent trespass." R. at 379, f 4. In essence, the court determined that 
the Drive-Through Facilities constituted a trespass, but the Plaintiffs were barred from 
requiring Defendants to remove the trespass by the applicable statute of limitations. 
However, the court then determined that the Declaration specifically allowed the Drive-
Through Facilities and the signs which Wendy's constructed. Plaintiffs assert that an act 
of trespass cannot be "authorized" by the Declaration. The trial court's determinations 
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are internally inconsistent and require reversal of the summary judgment granted in this 
case. Malstrom v. Consolidated Theatres, 290 P.2d 689, 690-691, (Utah 1955) ("if, on 
the same evidence, the trial court should make findings of fact necessarily contrary to 
each other, such action would be capricious and that such inconsistent findings should 
not be permitted to stand.5') 
The court's Order in this case enjoining the Plaintiffs from taking any action to 
inhibit Wendy's use of the Drive-Through Facilities was legally incorrect. As noted in 
Point Heading I, above, it is apparent that the court's construction of the Declaration was 
incorrect as a matter of law. Therefore, the Declaration does not authorize the continued 
maintenance and use of the improvements. As shown below, the trial court's decision on 
the statute of limitations question also fails to legitimize Wendy's use of Plaintiffs' 
property. 
While Plaintiffs may not be able to require Wendy's to remove the offending 
structures and improvements, nothing in the litigation has established a permanent right 
for Wendy's (or its predecessors) to maintain the improvements perpetually. Assuming 
for purposes of argument that the trial court's decision on the statute of limitations 
question was correct, Plaintiffs should still have every legal right, at their own expense, 
to remove the encroaching facilities and to restore the property to its appropriate and 
designated common area use. 
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Wendy's has not acquired a prescriptive easement over the property. That element 
of its counterclaim appears to have been abandoned in the court below. However, if the 
trial court's decision is upheld, the sole and exclusive use of Plaintiffs' property will have 
vested in the Defendant. Wendy's abandonment of its prescriptive easement claim is 
instructive on this point. In Nyman v. Anchor Dev. LLC, 2003 UT 27, 73 P.3d 357, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Here the term "use" implies an inherent distinction in the 
property rights conferred by an easement, on the one hand, 
and outright ownership, on the other. "A prescriptive 
easement does not result in ownership, but allows only use of 
property belonging to another for a limited purpose." 
Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 667, 681 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) affd 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990). Thus, we have 
previously observed that: whenever there is ownership of 
property subject to an easement, there is a dichotomy of 
interest, both of which must be respected and kept in balance. 
On the one hand, it is to be realized that the owner of the fee 
title, because of his general ownership, should have the use 
and enjoyment of his property to the highest degree possible, 
not inconsistent with the easement. On the other, the owner of 
the easement should likewise have the right to use and enjoy 
his easement to the fullest extent possible not inconsistent 
with the rights of the fee owner. N Union Canal Co. v. 
Newell, 550 P.2d 178. 179 (Utah 1976). Maintaining such a 
balance between the rights of the fee title owner and a 
purported easement holder becomes impossible when the 
latter asserts a right to permanent, exclusive occupancy of the 
fee owner's land. We conclude that the right to keep a garage 
on another's property falls outside the scope of a prescriptive 
easement, and therefore, the latter is simply unavailable to 
Nyman as an alternative in this case. Indeed we know of no 
prior Utah case recognizing a prescriptive easement right to 
maintain a permanent structure on someone else's property." 
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Nyman, 2003 UT 27, f 18. (emphasis added). It would appear that Wendy's abandoned 
its prescriptive easement claim because the law clearly does not support it. However, the 
trial court's decision has the same effect as the grant of a prescriptive easement. The trial 
court's decision grants to Wendy's a right to "permanent, exclusive occupancy" of 
Plaintiffs' property. If that right is unavailable through a prescriptive easement analysis, 
it certainly should not vest through application of the statute of limitations to a trespass 
claim. See also Plant v. Johnson, 185 S.W. 2d 711 (Ark. 1945) (holding that a failure to 
file on tax claim within the statute of limitation period could not result in the forfeiture of 
ownership of property). Assuming the trial court's decision on the statutes of limitation 
was correct, while damages may not be available to the Plaintiffs, they can certainly 
reclaim their property. Therefore, the court's Order is obviously contrary to the purpose 
and intent of Utah law. 
V. THE COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES WAS IN ERROR. 
In Utah, an award of attorneys' fees must be either based on statutory authority or 
a contract. Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2002 UT App 406, f 13, 60 P.2d 
1776. When an award is based on contract, the terms and provisions of the contract 
calling for attorneys' fees are controlling. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 
(Utah 1991). In this case, the Declaration establishes the contractual right to attorneys' 
fees and provides as follows: 
(i) Attorneys' Fees. In the event the legal proceedings are 
brought or commenced to enforce any of the terms of this 
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Declaration against any owner or other party with an 
interest in the Shopping Center, the successful party in 
such action shall then be entitled to receive and shall 
receive from the defaulting owner or party a reasonable 
sum as attorneys' fees and costs to be fixed by the court 
in the same action. 
R. at 47. While the Declaration establishes a right to recover attorneys' fees for a 
successful party in litigation, such fees must be recovered from a defaulting owner or 
party. The conduct of the Plaintiffs in this case is not at issue. There has been no 
allegation or finding that Plaintiffs have been or are in default of any of their obligations 
under the Declaration. Accordingly, the court's award of attorneys' fees in this matter 
was in error. 
In addition to the foregoing, Utah law clearly provides that a party seeking 
attorneys' fees has a duty to allocate the fees it is requesting among the separate causes 
of action or claims pursued in the litigation. Brown v. David K. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 
470 (Utah App 1999). In this case, the Court made no effort to require the Defendants to 
provide a proper allocation between the separate causes of action. This is especially 
troubling in this case where the Court's initial decision specified only a statute of 
limitations bar, but after the Defendant's submission of proposed Findings and 
Conclusions, was extended to cover issues under the terms of Declaration also. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing, it is apparent that there were significant, material fact 
disputes regarding critical facts at issue in this litigation. However, notwithstanding such 
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factual disputes, the court awarded summary judgment to the Defendants, dismissing 
Plaintiffs' claims and awarding judgment to Wendy's on its Counterclaim. In essence, 
the court's decision has taken Plaintiffs' property, properly characterized under the 
Declaration as "common area" for the use and benefit of the owners and parties to the 
Declaration, and has vested the sole and exclusive use of that property in Wendy's. 
Plaintiffs have no access to or ability to use the property in the manner contemplated by 
the Declaration. This is clearly in violation of specific terms of the contract between the 
parties, producing an unjust result. 
Wendy's entered on the Plaintiffs' property and constructed improvements with 
full knowledge that it was trespassing and that there was an objection to its actions. 
Wendy's has constructed free standing signs in violation of the express terms of the 
Declaration. The decision of the trial court in this matter should be overturned and the 
case remanded for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J™1 day of August, 2006. 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
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THIS DECLARATION OP RESTRICTIONS AND GRANT OP EASEMENTS 
Is made as of the of M.y, 1982, by and between THE 
BQYER COMPANY, a Otah General Partnership ("Boyer"), WHITE 
INVESTMENT/ INC., a Otah corporation/ PAPAHIKOLAS BROTHERS 
ENTERPRISES, a general partnership and MELVILLE LTD.. a Utah 
limited partnership (collectively, "White"), all c# wfcom are 
collectively referred to herein as the "Declarants"• 
R E C I T A L S 
(A) WHEREAS, White is or will be at the time of this 
documents recordation, the owner of that certain real property 
located in the County of Salt Lake, State o£ Utah, designated 
and shown as Parcels One and Two (hereinafter "Parcel One" and 
•Parcel Two", respectively) on the site plan attached-hereto as 
Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by reference (the "Plot 
Plan"); and 
(B) WHEREAS, Boyer is or will be at the tine of this 
document's recordation, the owner of that certain real property 
located in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, designated 
and shown as Parcel Three on the Plot Plan ("Parcel Three"); and 
(C) WHEREAS, American Stores Properties, Inc., a 
Delaware corporation ("ASP1") is or will be at the time of this 
document's recordation, the tenant under a lonq term ground 
lease on that certain real property located in the County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah, designated and shown as Parcel One, 
on the Plut IIan; and 
trt 
& 
•O 
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(D) WHE'AEAS, the legal descriptions of Parcels One, 
5Vo# and Three ar'i set forth on Exhibit "B" attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by re£ecence# all of which are referred to 
herein as the "Shopping Center"! 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, and 
the covenants and agreements set forth herein. Declarants agree 
as follows; 
X# INCORPORATION, 
Recitals (A) through (D) ace incorporated herein and 
made a part hereof, 
II. DEFINITIONS, 
The following terns shall have the meaning specified 
belov* 
*• 9XSSL9 I h e trrw "Owner* or "Owners* means the 
Owner of Parcel One, Owner of Parcel Two. and the Owner of 
Parcel JThree* 
B» Owner of Parcel One, The term "Owner of Parcel 
Ohe^means White and its respective assigns, grantees and 
successors in interest having fee record title to all or any 
portion or Parcel One* 
;:€• :Owner of Parcel Two* The term "Owner of Parcel 
Tyio* means White and its respective assigns, grantees and 
successors in interest having fee record title to all or any 
portion of Parcel Two* 
D, Owner of Parcel Three, The term "Owner of Parcel 
Three" means Boyer and its respective assigns, grantees and _, 
w 
sucessors in interest having fee record title for all or any ^ 
portion of Parcel Three; g 
E. ASPI. The term "ASPI" means American Stores g 
Properties, Inc./ a Delaware corporation and its successors and OD 
assigns- under a long term lease with White as landlord and ASPI 
as tenant on Parcel One, so long as such lease is in .Corce and 
effect. 
III. BUILDING AREA AND COMMON AREA. 
A. Building Area. No building or other structure 
shall be constructed on those portions of the Shopping Center 
which are cross-hatched on the Plot Plan and labeled "Common 
Area Only,' The tern "Building Area* shall mean that area in 
the Shopping Center upon which buildings and related structures 
are constructed or are being constructed, and which is not 
designated as Common Area Only. Each owner hereby agrees with 
respect tq its Parcel, that it will devote to use for retail 
sales and financial or food services only chat port! m of the 
Building Area on such Parcel which would comply with and be 
allowable under applicable zoning regulations relating to 
parking ratio requirements for such Parcel, taking into account 
only the parking area of such Parcel* 
B. Common Area. The term "Common Area" as used 
herein shall mean those areas of the Shopping Center which, 
from time to time, are not Building Area. Comsion Area sha?l be 
used only for vehicular access, circulation and parking, 
pedestrian traffic and the comfort and convenience of the 
Owners, tenants, customers, invitees, licensees, agents and 
employees of the Owners and business occupants of the buildings 
constructed in the Shopping Center, and for the servicing and 
supplying of such businesses, except as otherwise provided 
herein. In addition, the Common Area may be used (i) in 
connection with the construction, maintenance and repair of any 
buildings and the common Area of the Shopping Center so long as 
such use does not unreasonably restrict access to and from and 
the conduct of business from the buildings in the Shopping 
Center or access to and from the adjacent streets; (ii) in 
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connection with the construction and maintenance of utility 
lines, so long as such activity is undertaken after obtaining 
the written permission of the Owners and ASPI; and (iii) for 
any other use required by any governmental authority having 
jurisdiction thereof. No building, barricade or structure may 
be placed, erected or constructed within the Common Area on any 
paxcel except loading and delivery docks and covered areas 
attached to such docks, trash enclosures, outride storage areas 
(which docks, trash enclosures and storage areas shall not be 
located in the front of any building within the Shopping 
Center), pylon (to the extent not herein prohibited) and 
directional signs, bumper guards or curbs, paving, landscaping 
and landscape planters, lighting standards, driveways, 
sidewalks, walkways, parking stalls, columns or pillars 
supporting roof overhangs, and any other improvements as may be 
required under applicable laws, rules, ordinances and 
regulations of any governmental body having jurisdiction over 
the Shopping Center. There shall be no charge or other 
validation for parking on the Common Area (unless required by 
governmental regulations) without the prior written consent of 
the Owners and AS PI. The parking and vehicular traffic patterns 
for the areas of the Shopping Center which are designated 
"Common Area Only11 on the Plot Plan shall be designed, 
installed and maintained as shown on the Plot Plan* The 
parking requirements of each Parcel shall be maintained in 
accordance with applicable zoning regulations, as set forth in 
Paragraph A immediately above. 
C. Construction of Common Areas. The Common Areas 
on P&rcel Three as shown on the Plot Plan shall be constructed 
by and at the sole expense of the Owner of Parcel Three by the 
earlier of (i) a date prior to the completion of remodeling to 
the building on building area A on Parcel Three as shown on the 
Plot Plan or (ii) January 1, 1984• The Common Areas on Parcels 
One and Two shall be completed, respectively, at the expense of 
the Owner of such parcel, upon the earlier of (i) completion of 
any new buildings on such parcel, or (ii) the date on which any 
building on such parcel i; open to the public foe business. 
D. Design and Construction of Buildings. In no 
6rent shall any building constructed in the Shopping Center 
exceed one (1) story (excluding mezzanines) nor shall any 
building (excepting the existing buildings as presently 
constructed in the Shopping Center) exceed a height of 
thirty-five (35) feet. There shall be no party walls in the 
Shopping Center, and even though a wall on the boundary of a 
Parcel-oay~abut~a. wall on the boundary of another Parcel, they 
shall not be deemed to be party walls, provided however, the 
.easterly .portion of any building on Parcel Two may abut the 
wall of any building on Parcel Three so long as the v$ll of 
such building on Parcel Three is .not used as a load bearing 
wall for the benefit of the building on Parcel Two. The Owner 
of Parcel Threa agrees to enter into a party wall agreement at 
the request of the Owner of Parcel Two, the ter?s of which 
shall be consistant with.the foregoing and consistent with the 
terms of party wall agreements commonly used in shopping 
centers similar to the Shopping Center. 
IV. EASEMENTS. 
A. Ingress, Egress and Parking? Access Drives, Each S 
Owner# as grantor with respect to each parcel owned by such $£ 
Owner, hereby grants to each of the other Owners, as grantees, w 
for the benefit of each of such other Owners and their 
respective tenants, employees, agents, customers and invitee 
of such tenants/ and for the benefit of each parcel owned by 
each granteer a non-exclusive easement appurtenant to each 
parcel, owned by each grantee for ingress and egress by 
vehicular and pedestrian traffic and for vehicular parking 
upon, over and across the Common Area within each parcel or 
parcels owned by the grantor* Such easements shall be for the 
Common Area uses described in Article ZIZ Paragraph B above and 
shall be subject to all restrictions Imposed on such uses by 
this Declaration. 
Each Owner of Parcel One, Parcel Two, and Parcel Three 
as grantor with respect to each parcel owned by such owner, 
hereby grants to each of the other Owners, as grantees, for the 
benefit of each of such other Owners and their respective 
tenants and invitees and for the benefit of each such parcel, a 
ncn-erclusive easement to be used as access drives over and 
across each such parcel for ingress and egress by vehicular and 
pedestrian traffic from adjacent streets which access drives 
are more particularly identified and shown on the Plot Plan as 
the "Access Drives9. Such Owner further agrees not to use or 
permit the use of the Access Drives in such manner as to 
interfere with any other Owner's (or ASPI's) use thereof and 
agrees that the Access Drives shall not be used for vehicular 
parking. 
B. Building Encroachment. Each Owner hereby grants 
to the other Owners nn ease me tit to maintain footings, 
foundations, eaves, walls, roof overhangs and other portions of 
a building to the extent they encroach upon an adjoining Parcel 
by no more than eighteen (18) inches, and each Owner agrees to 
gr'inc easements for such purposes to the other Owners if the 
encroachment is greater than eighteen (18).Inches on an 
adjoining Parcel, if such encroachments are, in the reasonable 
opinion of the grantor, of a minor or inconsequential nature. 
The owner ao encroaching agrees not to interfere with an 
existing structure on the servient Parcel. The easement 
granted in this paragraph shall survive this Declaration and 
ahall last so long as the building of which such encroachments 
are a part is standing• The exercise by one Owner of the 
fights herein granted shall be at no cost to the othet Owner 
unless agreed to in writing by the other Owner and shall be 
performed so as no interfere as little as possible with the 
other Owner's use and enjoyment of its Parcel; and, if the 
surface of either owner9s parcel and/or any improvements 
thereon shall be disturbed by an Owner1* exercise of the rights 
herein granted, such surface and/or improvements shall be 
promptly restored by such Owner, at such Cvner's sole cost and 
expense, to its condition just prior to such disturbance« 
With respect to each overlapping encroachment 
easement, the first Owner to construct any building or other 
improvement within such encroachment easement atea (including 
existing buildings or improvements) shall be entitled to 
maintain such building and improvements -tnd Shall not be 
required to remove or alter the same to enable She other Owner 
to build in the same encroachment easement area. 
V. WtHTBWAKCg. 
Each Owner, at its own expense, shall maintain the 
area designated as Common Area Only on the plot Plan and 
located on its parcel at all times in good and clean condition 
and repair, which maintenance shall include, but not be limited 
to the following: 
(a) Maintaining the paved surfaces in a level, 
smooth and evenly covered condition with the type of 
surfacing material originally instilled or such 
subst i tute an shal l in a l l respects be equal or 
superior in qual i ty , use and durabil ity; 
(b) Removing a l l papers, debris, f i l t h , refuse, 
snow, ice and water and thoroughly sweeping the area 
to the extent reasonably necessary to keep the araa in 
*- clean and orderly condition? 
(c) Pl ic ing, keeping in repair, and replacing 
any necessary appropriate directional signs* markers 
and l i n e s ; 
""$&:.> Q£*?£fc*?5ft k?eP*n9; in repair* and replacing* 
where nece»^a^^, stjch . ar t i f i c ia l l ighting f a c i l i t i e s 
es^sha^bcj^reisonAbly required* e l l of which sha l l be 
>'• - \ . *;•*••* •" ' .. I • > W ~ * . ' • • • • • 
^S^k^^k^^M:t^..^k parcel ott which' they axe 
•^/>£.?$£)• ./|ii^ \^*siaSMLr^ ^r*^ ^Bt. -4Bndf'tsnofmt?cqiolMrdL access to 
:'*nd^l^i^;.i^^ adjoining portions of the 
^^ Xm^ BiE^ i^SF^ K^^ yi^ i^ -- «S0»a^ r the/ .areas: Sssitfnarted as- Common 
' ^ ^ ^ A ^ ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ i ^ t ^ l e n -and -to rand; f war • i t s - p a x c e ! 
and- 't&e-streets adjacent*thereto» 
••" ?{$k %ift'^6-event'- aa Owner or ASS*, desires to. 
!*i*j* Hfeti^ lCoiiiacR Area lighting;, or* any portion thereof, 
on ario^er Owner""s/PiLrcal l i t during, hours when, such 
• ?- • -y-* ,.v<^- • • 
ot^er: O^nt^ ^ould «ot noraw&Ily haw such l ight ing l i t , 
i u c ^ cause i t s Ctyamofc Area l ighting 
•jorSeliri«an tJieWof* as the case may be, to be l i t 
&%i. -'•• & ^ **'%;**• . \ v ; "' -
^uriungj^e^buri- %&p£sted in writing,, upoir the Owner 
• .^ i '* ;••• ''.,' -3."Y .;v" . • * • ' . " 
'-^3ls»C '• so • i e ^ e r f ^ ^ and'agreeing in writing to pay 
3 i ^ ; e h & 
whli^K^atfts ^hail^ includtey but not be Ifmited t o , the 
coat. . j g J f ^ ^ t r i ^ i ^ aainten^nce and' bulbs j provided^ 
bowe^^rviltliiajt^hr Owner of the\farcel #as towhicfi 
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additional lighting is requested shall have the right 
to disapprove a request for additional lighting if 
such Owner determines that the proration and 
reimbursement of costs and expenses would be 
unreasonably cumbersome or burdehsome. 
VI • RESTRICTIONS. 
A. Shopping Center Business. The Shopping Center 
and all parts thereof may be used only for the construction, 
operation and maintenance of mercantile, business, financial, 
food retailing and professional establishments and related 
facilities, including vehicular driveway and parking areas as 
more particularly described herein. 
No part of the Shopping Center shall be devoted to use 
for selling, renting, leasing or displaying for the purposes of 
selling, renting or leasing any motor vehicle, boat or trailer, 
movie theaters, adult bookstores, bowling alleys, skating 
rinks, or bars or taverns (except in restaurants). No building 
featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through* traffic shall be 
located on Parcel Three, except as shown on the Plot Plan, 
without the prior written consent of the Owner of Parcel TWO 
and ASPI, including consent to the location of the drive-in, 
drive-up or drive-through lanes of such facility. Such consent 
will not be unreasonably withheld provided that .the location of 
such lanes and the use thereof do not impede or inhibit access 
to and from and t.1e conduct of business from the buildings in «*, 
the shopping Center or access to and from the adjacent streets. ot 
B. Parking Restrictions. No persons, other than g 
Owners, tenants and occupants of the Shopping Center, and Hicir jf 
customers, employees and invitees, shall be permitted to park & 
in the Common Area, unless all owners and ASPI give their prior 
written approval. 
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C. Employee Parking* Specific areas within the 
Common Area of the Shopping Center to be used for motor vehicle 
parking purposes by employees of occupants of the Shopping 
Center may be designated from time to time by the unanimous 
written consent of the Owners and ASPI. In the event employee 
parking areas are designated as provided herein, employees of 
any Owner, tenant or other occupant of any building in the 
Shopping Center shall use only those portions of the Common 
Area designated for such employee motor vehicle parking 
purposes. The authority herein granted shall be exercised in 
such manner as not to discriminate against any Owner, ASPI or 
commercial establishment in the Shopping Center. 
VII. SIGNS. 
Each Owner shall have the right to maintain such signs 
on the interior - f buildings located on its parcel as it 
desires, whether or not such signs are visible from the 
exterior. As permitted by local ordinances and other applicable 
governmental regulations, each Owner shall have the right to 
erect, maintain and replace signs on the exterior of buildings 
located on its parcel; provided, in no event shall signs be 
located on the roofs (excluding canopies so long as no sign is 
erected on a canopy which sign will extend above the height of 
the building roof) of any buildings in the Shopping Center 
without the prior written consent of all Owners and ASPI. 
The Owners of Parcels One and Two shall have the right 
to construct from time to time any sign or signs it deems 
ft 
advisable on its parcels* o 
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to j§ 
construct two (2) free-standing pylon, monument or other signs &> 
at the location designated on the Plot Plan as "Parcel Three 
§ 
Sign." No other pylon/ monument or other free-standing sign 
shall be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior written 
approval of all Owners and ASPI. 
VIII. INDEMNIFICATION. 
*• Indemnification of Owners. Each Owner agrees to 
indemnify, hold harmless and defend all other Owners from all 
claims, actions, liabilities, damages, expenses and judgments, 
including but not limited to attorneys9 fees, reasonable 
investigative and discovery costs, court costs and all other 
sums on account of any injury to persons, loss of life or 
damage to property occurring on any parcel owned by each such 
indemnifying Owner (including within any building located 
thereon) and on the streets and sidewalks adjacent thereto or 
- arising from or connected with the use, non-use, condition or 
- occupation - of* such-parcel,- streets or- sidewalks,-which- are..not 
caused, in whole or in part, by the active or passive 
negligence of the Owner (or its agents, contractors or 
employees) claiming such indemnification. 
B. Waiver of Certain Rights. Bach Owner hereby 
waives any rights it may have against another Owner on account 
of any loas or damage occasioned to each Owner, as t*>e case may 
"be, their respective parcels tiwclxnliTTg *"*ui-Mit*g* and -cont-ents 
of buildings thereon), or to other portions of the Shopping 
Center, arising from any risk generally covered by fire and 
extended coverage insurance whether or not such an insurance 
policy is maintained or there are insurance proceeds sufficient 
to cover the loss. Each Owner hereby waives: any right of 
subrogation that it may have against the other Owners in 
connection with any risk or claim covered by such fire and 
extended coverage insurance and shall procure from its insurers 
under all policies of fire and extended coverage insurance a 
waiver of all rights of subrogation which the insurers might 
otherwise have under such policies. 
IX. LIABILITY INSURANCE 
A. General Coverage and Limits. Each Owner agrees 
to maintain or cause to be maintained liability insurance 
against claims for bodily injury, death and property damage 
occurring onf in or about its parcel (including within the 
buildings thereon) and the streets and sidewalks adjacent to 
its parcel, with limits for one occurrence of not less than a 
"Combined Single Limit:" (covering bodily injury* death and 
property damage liability) of not less than One Million Doll»n 
($1,000,000). Such insurance may be in the form of blanket 
liability coverage applicable to the Owner's parcel and other 
property owned or occupied by the Owner or the party carrying 
such insurance coverage for the benefit of such Owner. So long 
as any Owner or party carrying such insurance coverage (or the 
responsible parent, subsidiary or affiliated companies of such 
Owner or party) shall have a net worth of more than Fifty 
Million Dollars ($50,000,000), such Owner or party may insure, 
in whole or in part, under any plan of self-insurance which 
such Owner or party (or the parent, subsidiary or affiliated 
companies of such Owner or party) may, from time to time, have 
in force and effect. Such Owner or party shall, upon request, 
provide the other Owners with evidence of such coverage and a 
description of any plan of self-insurance being used. 
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B. Performance of Indemnity Agreements. All Q 
policies of insurance required under this article shall insure %{ 
the performance of the Owner insured thereunder of the & 
indemnity agreements contained in Article VIII and shall 
M 
contain a provision that the insurance company will give twenty 
(20) days advance written notice to the Owners and ASPI of any 
cancellation or lapse, or the effective date of any reduction 
in the amounts or scope of coverage* Each Owner shall deliver 
to the other Owners a*id ASPI upon demand a certificate from the 
applicable insurer that such insurance required in this Article 
is in full force and effect and. that such insurance insures the 
performance by the Owner insured of the indemnity agreements to 
limits not less than those specified in this Article. Each 
Owner shall .promptly notify the other Owner(s) of any asserted 
claim with respect to which such Owner is or may be indemnified 
against hereunder and shall deliver to such Owner(s) copies of 
process and pleadings. 
X. DAMAGE OR DESTRUCTION, 
In the event any building in the Shopping Center is 
damaged or destroyed by any cause whatsoever, the Owner of the 
parcel upon which such building is located will either (i) 
cause the commencement of reconstruction to the damaged or 
destroyed building within ninety (90) days after such damage 
and destruction and will thereafter cause such reconstruction 
to be diligently prosecuted to completion; or (ii) within 
ninety (90) days of the date of damage or destruction, commence 
the removal of such damaged building and thereafter diligently 
prosecute to completion the removal of the damaged building, 
the removal of all debris from the building pad and the 
leveling and dust sealing of such building pad. In the event 
the Common Area of the Shopping Center or any portion thereof 
shall be damaged or destroyed by fire or other casualty or any 
other cause whatsoever, the Owner of the Common Area so damaged 
or destroyed shall i **hwith proceed with due diligence to 
restore such Common Area to a condition to permit free and safe 
vehicular and pedes' ian access and circulation and vehicular 
parking in the Shopping Center from and to all adjacent 
streets, in the manner required by this Declaration. 
XI. TAXES. 
Each Owner shall pay or cause to be paid directly to 
the tax collector prior to delinquency, all real property taxes 
and other special taxes and assessments assessed against the 
parcel owned by such Owner, subject to the right of any Owner 
and AS PI to contest such taxes and assessments in the manner 
provided by law* 
XII. GENERAL - PRO VIS IONS. 
A* Covenants Run With The Land. Each easement, 
restriction and covenant over each parcel ot parcels In the 
Shopping Center shall be appurtenant to and for the benefit of 
each other parcel in the Shopping Center and each part 
thereof* Each covenant, restriction and undertaking as to each 
parcel in the Shopping Center shall be a burden thereon for the 
benefit of each other parcel and each part thereof, and shall 
run with the land. Such covenants shall be prior and superior 
to all mortgages, deeds of trust and other liens now or 
hereafter executed on each parcel or parcels in the Shopping 
Center. 
B. Inurement. This Declaration and the easements, 
covenants, restrictions, benefits %nd obligations created 
hereby shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon each 
Owner and its successors and assigns; provided, if any Owner 
conveys any portion or all of its interest in any parcel owned 
by it, such Owner shall thereupon be released and discharged 
from any and all further obligations under this Declaration as 
it had in connection with the property conveyed by it if the 
buyer assumes in writing all of such obligations, and provided 
further, that no such sale shall release such Owner from any 
liabilities, actual or contingent, existing as of the time of 
such conveyance. 
C. Duration. Except as otherwise provided herein, 
this Declaration shall remain in full force and effect for a 
term of the longer of sixty (60) years from the date hereof, o«. 
the date the Ground Lease as defined below is terminated. 
Notwithstanding the above, in the event that certain 
ground lease on Parcel One between White as landlord and ASPI 
as tenant, of even date herewith, (the "Ground Lease") is 
terminated by virtue of the failure to comply with certain 
conditions precedent therein, this Declaration shall also 
terminate, except with respect to certain rights and 
obligations as set forth below, upon the giving by White of 
written notice thereof to Boyer, which notice shall be in the 
form of an affidavit of White stating that the* Ground Lease has 
terminated, which affidavit shall be recorded in the Office of' 
the County Recorder, Salt Lake County, Utah; provided, however, 
if no such notice has been given to Boyer by ;uly 1, 1984, this 
Declaration shall continue in force and effect for the duration 
set forth in tJie paragraph immediately above* 
In the event of an early termination of this 
Declaration as more particularly described in the paragraph 
immediately above, such termination shall not act as a 
termination of nor affect the existence, validity or 
enforceability of (i) the covenant of the Owner of Parcel Two 
not to construct any building or other structure on the 
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Non-Terminable Property* (ii) the easement granted across the 
Non-Terminable Property and the easement granted across Parcel 
Three for purposes of unimpeded ingress and egress to and from 
3300 South Street, and the maintenance thereof, (iii) the 
rights of the Owners to enforce such covenants and rights to 
such easements. Furthermore, at such time as all or a portion 
of Parcels One or Two is developed commercially, the owner 
thereof shall cause improved parking to be constructed and 
maintained in accordance with then existing governmental 
requirements. Such covenants and easements set forth above 
shall run with the land and shall inure to the benefit of and 
be binding upon each Owner and its successors and assigns for a 
period of time ending sixty (60) years from the date hereof* 
The term "Non-Terminable Property" as used herein is that 
property outlined on the Plot Plan
 #as such, and more 
'particularly described on Exhibit "C"' attached hereto and * 
Incorporated herein by reference. 
In the event an early termination of the Declaration 
occurs, as described above, and the Owner of Parcel One and/or 
the Owner of Parcel Two subsequently develops such Parcel or 
Parcels for purposes of a commercial development, such Owner or 
Owners shall negotiate in good faith with the Owner of Parcel 
Three in order to reach an agreement which will grant 
reasonable easements across Parcels One, Two 'and Three and 
related covenants in order to create an integrated shopping 
center. 
D. Injunctive Relief. In the event of any violation 
or threatened violation of any provision in this Declaration by 
any Owner, lessee, or occupant of any portion of the Shopping 
Center, any or all of the Owners and ASPI shall have the right, 
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in addition to the other remedies herein provided, to enjoin 
such violation or threatened violation* 
B. Right to Cure* Should any Owner fail to timely 
perforin any of its obligations hereunder and thereafter fail to 
cure such failure within fifteen (15) days of its receipt of 
any other Owner's or ASPI's written demand therefor/ the Owner 
or ASPI giving such notice shall, in addition to any other 
remedy provided at law or in this Declaration,' have the right 
(but not the obligation) to perform such obligation on behalf 
of the defaulting Owner and the defaulting Owner shall 
reimburse the curing Owner or ASPI, as the case may be, for the 
cost of performing such work within fifteen (15) days after 
rece±pt-of-billing-therefor-and^roof -of -payment*thereof. -In 
the event the defaulting Owner does not reimburse the curing 
Owner -or ASPI, as the case may be, within such fifteen (15) day 
period, such amount shall bear interest at the rate of twelve 
percent (12%) per annum or the highest legal rate, whichever is 
lower, as of the date of billing until paid. The curing Owner, 
or ASPI, 4S the case may be, shall have the right to exercise 
any and all rights which such curing Owner or ASPI might have 
•at law to collect the same. 
P. Modification. This Declaration may not be 
modified in any respect whatsoever or rescinded, in whole or in 
part, except with the written consent of the Owners and ASPI* 
Any modification or rescission of this Declaration may be made 
only by written instrument duly executed and acknowledged by 
the appropriate Owners and ASPI. 
G„ -Not -a Public -Dedication. Nothing -herein 
contained shall be deemed to be * gift or dedication of any 
portion of tho Shopping Center to the general public or for any 
public purposes whatsoever, it being the intention of the 
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Declarants that this Declaration shall be strictly limited to 
and for the purposes herein expressed. 
H. Breach Shall Not Permit Termination, No breach 
of this Declaration shall entitle any Owner to cancel# rescind 
or otherwise terminate this Declaration, but such limitations 
shall not affect in any manner, any other rights or remedies 
which such Owner or ASPI may have hereunder by reason of any 
breach of this Declaration. 
I.# Attorneys* Fees. In the event that legal 
proceedings are brought or commenced to enforce any of the 
terms of this Declaration against any Owner Or other party with 
an interest in the Shopping Center, the successful party in 
such action shall then be entitled to receive and shall receive 
from the defaulting Owner or party.a reasonable sum as 
attorneys1 fees and costs, to be fixed by the court in the same 
action. 
XIII. EMINENT DOMAIN. 
A. Owner's Right to Award. Nothing herein shall be 
construed to give an Owner any interest in any award or payment 
made to any other Owner in connection with any exercise of 
eminent domain or transfer in lieu thereof affecting any other 
Owner's parcel or giving the public or any government any 
rights in the parcels. In the event of any exercise of eminent 
domain or transfer in lieu thereof of any.part of the Common 
Area located within the Shopping Center, the award attributable 
to the land and improvements of such portion of the Common Area 
shall be payable only to its Owner# and no claim thereon shall 
be made by any other Owner. 
B. Collateral Claims. All other Owners or persons 
having an Interest in the Common Area so condemned may file 
collateral claims with the condemning authority for their 
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losses which are separate and apart from the value of the land 
area and improvements taken. 
C. Tenant's Claim* Nothing in this article shall 
prevent a tenant in the Shopping Center from making a claim 
against an Owner pursuant to the provisions of any lease 
between the tenant and Owner for all or a portion of any such 
award or payment. 
D. Restoration of Common Area. The Owner'of each 
portion of the Common Area so condemned shall promptly repair 
and restore the remaining portion of the Common Area so owned 
as near as practicable to its condition immediately prior to 
such condemnation or transfer to the extent that the proceeds 
of such award are sufficient to pay the cost of such 
restoration and repair and without contribution from any other 
Owner; provided, the Common Area shall be restored to a 
condition which permits the uses thereof which are contemplated 
herein. 
E. Restoration of Building Area. In the event any 
building located in the Shopping Center is partially condemned, 
the remaining portion of the building, if it is not restored, 
shall be demolished by the Owner of the parcel on which it is 
located and such Owner shall remove all debris resulting 
therefrom, and thereafter maintain such parcel in a smooth 
level condition, free and clear of all refuse and sealed 
against dust and shall restore the Common Area surrounding such 
building to the condition required by this Declaration. 
XIV. NOTICES. 
Any notice or demand given or served by one Owner to 
another or ASPI shall not be deemed to have been duly given or 
served unless in writing and forwarded by certified or 
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•BOYER 
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Consent 
ASPI hereby consents to the, foregoing Declaration of 
Restrictions and Grant of Easements as of the date first above 
written. 
AMERICAS STORES PROPERTIES, IHC, , 
a Delaware corporation 
By ^ 
President 
*7 r 
Seocetary 
''-.mHiM*"' 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
Set forth the legal descriptions of Parcel One, Two 4 Threei 
Parcel One; 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Lot 65 Canyon Rim 
Addition as Amended and Extended according to the official 
plat thereof, said point being North 0* 03• 15* West 
1136*358 feet to a county survey monument and South 89* 58• 
45" East along the 3300 South Street monument line 330.10 
feet and North 0* 03» 15* West 50-00 feet from the South 
quarter corner of Section 26, Township 1 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence North 
0# 03' 15* West 340.71 feet? thence North 36* 28f 14* West 
17,01 feet? thence North 0* 03' 15" West 532.57 feet? thence 
South 89p 56f 45" East 588.77 feet to the Northeast corner 
of Lot 64 of said Canyon Rim Addition Amended and Extended 
Subdivision? thence South 0° 021 10" East 112.00 feet? 
thence North 89# 56' 45" West 93.41-feet; thence South 0* 
03' 15" West 205.00 feet? thence North 89" 56• 45* West 
21.74 feet? thence South 0" 03• 15* West 229.05 feet; thence 
North 89° 58' 10" West 131.826 feet? thence South 0* 02f 10* 
East 140.654 feet; thence North 89° 58' 45* West 330.80 feet 
to the point of beginning. * Contains 322,294.0 square feet 
or 7.399 acres. 
Parcel Two: 
Beginning South 89* 58• 10" East 165.20 feet from the 
Southeast corner of Lot 64, Canyon Rim Addition as Amended 
and Extended according to the official plat thereof, said 
point of beginning also being North 0° 03' 15" West 1136.358 
feet to a county survey monument and South 89* 58' 45* East 
along the 3300 South Street monument line 1073.74 feet and' 
North 0° 02' 10" West 190.59 feet from the South quarter 
corner of Section 26, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Salt 
Lake Base and Heridian and running thence North 8*9* 584 10*" 
West 281.03 feet? thence north 0° 03' 15" East 229.05 feet? 
thence South 89* 56• 45" East 21.74 feet? thence North 0* 
03f 15" East 205.00 feet? thence South 89* 56* 45" East 
134.37 feet to the Southeasterly line of Metro Way (k 66 
foot right of v/ay) ? thence North 58 • 39' East along said 
Southeasterly line 75.19 feet? thence South 0° 02« 10" East 
473.11 feet to the point of beginning. Contains 13 8,617.0 
square feet or 2.723 acres. 
Parcel Threet 
Beginning at a point North 0° 02' 26" West 1136.358 
feet? South 89" 58' 45" East 980.366 feet? North 0°'02,*10" 
West 50.0 feet from the South Quarter Corner of Section 26, 
Township 1 South Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
said point being on the North line of 3300 South Street; 
thence -South. 8 9 •-581. 45". -East..307c- -teet.Jto-.the.lZest.Aine.jof 
Valley Street, thence North along the West line of Valley 
Street North 0° 02' 10" West 636.394 feet, thence North 89» 
56* 45* West 94.25 feet to a pc .nt on the South line of 
Metro Way; thence along said South line South 58* 39• East 
141.104 feet, thence South 0" 02* 10" West 472.3*t feet, 
thence North 89" 58• 10" West 92.275 feet, thence .South 0# 
04f East 140.592 feet to the point of beginning. 
s 
I 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
Set forth the legal description of 
the Non-Terminable Property 
Beginning at a point which is North Q* 02 • 26" West 
1136.358 feet to a county survey ihonuinent, South 89" 58f 45" 
East along the 3300 South Street monument line 1072.566 
feetr and North 0° 02• 10" West 190.576 feet from the South 
quarter corner of Section 26, Township 1 South, Kange 1 
Bast, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 0# 02• 10" 
West 111.54 feet; thence North 89" 581 10" West 190.00 feet; 
thence South 0" 02• 10" East 111.54 feet? thence South 89## 
58' 10" East 190.00 feet to the point of beginning. 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
ss 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
On the 30* day of / / i y i 1982, personally 
appeared before me £.#. &*.,#£** and ^ s / a ^ / <£.^2k*/os>, 
who being by me duly sworn, did say, that they are the 
_ _ P r e s i d e n t a n d
 mmmmmmmmmmmmm^l^mm^^ Secret* «' 
respect ive ly , of AMERICAN STORES PROPERTIES, I N C . , a Delaware 
corporation, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of 
said corporation by authority of i t s by-laws or resolution of 
i t s board of directors , and said £./?. Mirt&jn 
and/£w^/?/ £*jAL>*tni0 acknowledged to me that said 
corporation executed the same* 
• My .jCdmmi^ siorr Expires: 
^ ^ a ^ ^ . 
ary-Public 
iding at Salt Lake dsonfy 
Utah 
.OF 
•••-•' 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SB 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
* On the 
^£/£ day of Q*6j 
1982, personally 
^rppeared -before me ^ ^ # ^ ^ 4 ^ and 6^^lUYs£jAjdA~ .# 
who beinq by me duly sworn, "did say, that they are the — / 
ytCQ President and , Secretary, 
respect ive ly , of WHITE INVESTMENT, INC,, a Utah- corporation, 
and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said 
-corporation by authority of i t s by-laws or resolution of i t s 
board of d i r e c t o r s , and said /&*//A&<rlvufti dt^^A a n d 
L%4iih ll) /*&6JL4h&^ acknowledged to me t h a t said 
\ executed ' the same* corporate 
v«i>^MX. Commission Expires! 
O 
;•/ *i 
itary Public Notary 
Residing att <J*Utfo£qr /Ss£^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On the 7 ' dtty.ot y^ffe**^ 
personally appeared &• W***JJ /rJ^ui^y . 
who upon bain? duly sworn r did say, that he is the 
!JU*U**JL*'V&*CCUJ of «JCu /Skv^JC*. 
, 1982, 
T 
and 
is ft general partner of the Boyer Company and that his 
execution of the foregoing agreement is in his capacity as 
TJxJtkm - • ' O f 
and on behalf of the Boyer Company as a general partner 
thereof• 
^(£&-U~-
CA 
ftfe 
§ 
OD 
Cft 
Notarj^BOSiic „..•••, "•".,.. > 
Residing at:y&*<£ £<jLS:'"' X. \ 
'.) • : • * ' • 
Hy Commission Expires* u 
tt~ja*tf .'.>: •- ,i
J 
• J ' . ' -:•• •* / 
-••-#*' / 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE* 
I 6 . 0 . / D ^ V r u f i , / , 'a notary public in 
and for said county and state, certify that on the«2£)7*"day of 
,1982, personally appeared before me 
J^^+^JAA., &/*C who being by me duly sworn did 
say, that he, *Jol\{\ r&fifcrtrt &/*~S \ *« the 
lSt*v*»J' /whltA^ , of PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS 
ENTERPRISES, a general partnership, and that the within, and 
foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of such partnership 
and ^Mn TJJ&ZJL* fc*J*£ duly acknowledged to me 
that sutih partnership executed the same as i t s free act and 
deed. 
WITHESS my hand and off ic ial seal as of the date f irst 
above vritte 
* * " / ; Notary Public ~ * i f •%.. » f flQ/CVrY J U D A I C y
 Mf , +. •*Vi*a-y 
y/5$ ^ L , Striding i^Jtf4?^£dxc^? IOZJL 
^yx.CbnuaiflTslon Sp ires : 
i \yu\PMr 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE) 
9 a notary public 
in and for said county and state, certify .that on thttxb7* day 
of n)tM~* , 1982# personally appeared before me 
who being by me duly sworn did 
say, that be, fawn fl- /ft*fr/k- < i« »'• 
fl/n0Adl Mbc/xiA^ of MELVILLE LTD., a Otah limited 
partnership, and that the within and foregoing instrument was 
signed in behalf of such limited partnership and 
MtStm M - M&fv* //*£~ duly acknowledged to ne that 
such partnership executed the same as its free act and deed. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal as ox. the date first 
above written. 
x-r o* tSLh)*!****-
M^ f# Commission Expires;-
December 12,2005 
Minute Entry 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL S ^ S f R W P - ^ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE fyfe UTAH Deputycierk 
PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS 
ENTERPRISES, LC, and WHITE 
INVESTMENT CO., INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED HAMBURGERS 
OF NEW YORK, INC., 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 040915948 
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
December 12, 2005 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, The Court heard oral 
argument with respect to the motion on December 12, 2005. 
Following the hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motion, memoranda, exhibits 
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the 
following ruling. 
With their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek damages and the 
demolition of a traffic island which marks the edge of the drive-
through lane at a Wendy's restaurant on 3300 South. 
Specifically, with this motion, Defendant argues the island 
has marked the edge of the drive-through lane since 1982, 
accordingly, the statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs' 
trespass and breach of contract causes of action ran years ago. 
Moreover, contends Defendant, the traffic island's location is 
authorized by the Declaration of Restrictions and Grants of 
Easements (the "Declaration") governing Plaintiffs' and Wendy's 
properties. Indeed, asserts Defendant, the Declaration clearly 
contemplates Wendy's operation of a drive-through restaurant and 
Plaintiffs granted an express easement appurtenant for the 
purpose of providing vehicular access to the restaurant.1 Even 
xUsing this same reasoning, Defendant seeks summary judgment 
on Plaintiffs' final cause of action that Defendant breached the 
Declaration by maintaining a pair of menu-board signs. According 
to Defendant, the signs are a normal and necessary feature of 
PAPANIKOLAS v. WENDY'S Page 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
if the Declaration were not read in such a manner, it is 
Defendant's position that since Wendy's and its predecessors have 
used the drive-through continuously for more than 20 years, they 
are the owner of a prescriptive easement. Finally, Defendant 
seeks fees as provided for in the Declaration. 
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing there is no 
prescriptive easement as this requires maintaining a balance 
between the rights of the fee title owner and the purported 
easement holder, and in this case, the use is exclusively for 
Wendy's and its patrons. Moreover, contend Plaintiffs, nothing 
in the Declaration allows drive-through facilities and at most, 
the Declaration permits two signs on Parcel Three. As for 
Defendant's claim that Plaintiffs' causes of action are time 
barred, Plaintiffs note it is undisputed that the earliest that 
Wendy's obtained possession of its property and commenced the 
remodeling of the former Burger King restaurant was on February 
28, 2003. Accordingly, argue Plaintiffs, none of the limitations 
referred to by Defendant's could have run prior to the filing of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
After reviewing the record in this matter, as well as the 
applicable Utah law, the Court finds the proper focus in a 
statute of limitations analysis is the time at which the cause of 
action accrued, not the identity of the parties involved. See 
Utah Dep't of Envlt. Quality v. Redd, 2002 UT 50, % 16, 48 P.3d 
230 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1). While Plaintiffs' suggest 
the trespass is continuing, rather than permanent and, therefore, 
their lawsuit is timely, the Court disagrees. At issue in this 
case is a landscaped island edged with concrete curbing, which is 
considerably more permanent than the pile of "rocks, soil, and 
other debris" which constituted the act of trespass contested in 
Brieggar Properties, L.C. V. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 2002 UT 
1953, p.11, 52 P.3d 1133. This said, it is undisputed the 
alleged trespass and breach of the Declaration occurred in or 
about 1982 and, consequently, the causes of action are time 
barred. 
Based upon the forgoing, Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. Defendant is asked to prepare the 
appropriate affidavit of fees and submit the same for 
consideration by the Courtg 
drive-through restaurants. 
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DATED t h i s A <i d a y of December, 2005 
J . D 
DISTB/ICT-
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 040915948 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail TODD J GODFREY 
ATTORNEY PLA 
2118 E 3900 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84124 
Mail MICHAEL Z HAYES 
ATTORNEY PLA 
2118 E 3900 S STE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84124 
Mail RONALD G RUSSELL 
ATTORNEY DEF 
185 S STATE ST STE 1300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
Dated t h i s loL day of J)g^ 20 05 
$ * 
Deputy Court Clerk 
March 21,2006 
Minute Entry 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL-DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF ^^^THlCf cou 
. •• *•*' ' lio+~: . &istric 
PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS 
ENTERPRISES, L.C.; and WHITE 
INVESTMENT CO., INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED HAMBURGERS 
OF NEW YORK, INC., 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 040915948 
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
March 17, 2006 
D<*M] ycsr 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
Judgment and Affidavit and Award of Attorney's Fees, and 
Plaintiffs Objection thereto, submitted for decision on March 9, 
2006. Oral argument has not been requested. 
After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court finds 
Plaintiffs' objections are without merit. Accordingly, the Court 
overrules the same. Moreover, with respect to attorney fees, the 
Court is persuaded Defendant is entitled to an award of fees and 
that such fees are reasonable. 
Based upon-the forgoing, the Court will enter the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Final Judgment and 
enter on the Final Judgment the attorney fees and costs 
established by the affidavit of counsel. 
This Minute Entry constitutes the order regarding the 
matters addressed herein. No further order is required. 
DATED this 20k. day of March, 2006, 
w$^m, 
ERIC-H 
T JUDGE0'-
Case No. 040915948 PR 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify tftat on the 21st day of March, 2006, I sent by first 
class mail, a true and correct copy of the attached document to the 
following: 
Ronald G. Russell 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0019 
Michael Z. Hayes 
Todd J. Godfrey 
2118 East 3900 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1725 
^ & 
District Court Deput/yy Clerk 
Findings of Fact 
and 
Conclusions of Law 
FILES BISTiiST mmi 
Third Judicial District 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS ] 
ENTERPRISES, L.C; and WHITE ; 
INVESTMENT CO., INC., ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED ; 
HAMBURGERS OF NEW YORK, INC., ] 
Defendant. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 040915948PR 
1 Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
This matter came before the court on December 12,2005 for oral argument on the 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New 
York, Inc. ("Wendy's"). Ronald G. Russell appeared on behalf of Wendy's. Michael Z. Hayes 
and Todd J. Godfrey appeared on behalf of plaintiffs Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises, L.C. and 
White Investment Co., Inc. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under 
MAR 2 1 2006 
SALT LAKE, COUNTY 
B Y I -•-J
 ^ Deputy Clerk 
advisement and issued its Minute Entry dated December 12, 2005. Accordingly, the court enters 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The court finds that the following facts are undisputed: 
1. Wendy's owns the real property located at 3259 East 3300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah (the "Wendy's Property") on which is located a restaurant building and related 
improvements. 
2. The Wendy's Property is adjacent to the Canyon Rim Shopping Center (the 
"Shopping Center"), which is owned by plaintiffs. 
3. Both the Wendy's Property and the Shopping Center are included in the property 
described in the Declaration of Restrictions and Grant of Easements (the "Declaration"), which 
was recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder on September 12,1982 as 
Entry No. 3714292, in Book 5410, at Page 823. A copy of the Declaration is attached to the 
Affidavit of Lew Swain as Exhibit "A." 
4. The Declaration was signed by both plaintiffs. 
5. The Declaration identifies three distinct parcels of property within the property 
described therein. The Wendy's Property is located within what the Declaration refers to as 
"Parcel Three." 
6. The Wendy's Property was developed as a Burger King restaurant by The Boyer 
Company in or about 1982. 
2 
7. At the time the Burger King restaurant was constructed on the Wendy's Property in 
or about 1982, a drive through lane was also constructed on the north side of the Wendy's 
Property. The drive through lane is bounded on the north by a narrow, landscaped island edged 
with concrete curbing, and on the south by the restaurant (the drive through lane and related 
island are referred to hereinafter as the "Drive Through Facilities"). 
8. The Drive Through Facilities extend from the northwest comer of the restaurant 
located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast onto what is defined by the Declaration as the 
"Common Area" of the Shopping Center. 
9. The Plot Plan shows the Drive Through Facilities as two curved lines running from 
the northwest comer of the restaurant located on the Wendy's Property to the northeast. 
10. With respect to Parcel Three, the Declaration provides that "[n]o building featuring 
drive-in, drive-up or drive-through traffic shall be located on Parcel Three, except as shown on 
the Plot Plan " 
11. With respect to the "Common Area," the Declaration provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
Common Area shall be used only for vehicular access, circulation and 
parking, pedestrian traffic and the comfort and convenience of the Owners 
[i.e., the owners of the property to which the Declaration pertains], tenants, 
customers, invitees, licensees, agents and employees of the Owners and 
business occupants of the buildings constructed in the Shopping Center 
[i.e., the owners of the property to which the Declaration pertains], and for 
the servicing and supplying of such businesses, except as otherwise 
provided herein.. . . No building, barricade or structure may be placed, 
erected or constructed within the Common Area on any parcel except 
loading and delivery docks and covered areas attached to such docks, trash 
enclosures, outside storage areas . . . pylon (to the extent not herein 
3 
prohibited) and directional signs, bumper guards or curbs, paving, 
landscaping and landscape planters, lighting standards, driveways, 
sidewalks, walkways, parking stalls, columns or pillars supporting roof 
overhangs, and any other improvements as may be required under 
applicable laws, rules, ordinances and regulations of any governmental 
body having jurisdiction over the Shopping Center.. . . The parking and 
vehicular traffic patterns for the areas of the Shopping Center which are 
designated "Common Area Only" on the Plot Plan [attached to the 
Declaration as Exhibit "A"] shall be designed, installed and maintained as 
shown on the Plot Plan. 
12. From the time they were constructed in or about 1982 through the present, the 
Drive Through Facilities have remained in continuous use in the same location and 
configuration. 
13. With respect to signage on Parcel Three, the Declaration states that: 
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to construct two (2) 
free-standing pylon, monument or other signs at the location designated on 
the Plot Plan as "Parcel Three Sign." No other pylon, monument or other 
free-standing sign shall be permitted on Parcel Three without the prior 
written approval of all Owners . . . . 
14. In addition to a pylon sign along 3300 South at the south end of Wendy's Property, 
and a directional sign located on the Drive Through Facilities, Wendy's maintains two menu 
board signs on the Wendy's Property (the "Menu Board Signs"). 
15. Menu board signs have existed on the Wendy's Property continuously since 1982. 
16. Menu board signs like the Menu Board Signs are essential to the operation of drive 
through restaurants. 
17. The Declaration provides that in the event legal proceedings are brought to enforce 
any provision of the Declaration as against any party with an interest in the property described 
4 
therein, the successful party in the action shall be entitled to recover "a reasonable sum as 
attorneys' fees and costs" from the other party. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing undisputed facts, the court makes the following Conclusions of 
Law: 
1. Plaintiffs' claims for trespass are barred by the three-year statute of limitations 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1). 
2. According to the Utah Supreme Court, the statute of limitations for trespass actions 
begins to run as soon as the trespass occurs. See Breiggar Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, 
Inc., 2002 UT 53,1111. 
3. Plaintiffs contend that the alleged trespass is continuing, rather than permanent, 
and that the cause of action in this case did not accrue until Wendy's acquired its interest in the 
property. The court disagrees. 
4. At issue in this case is a landscaped island edged with concrete curbing, which is 
considerably more permanent that the pile of "rocks, soil, and other debris" which constituted the 
act of trespass contested in Breiggar Properties. The court, therefore, concludes that the alleged 
trespass is permanent and has been so since 1982. 
5. With respect to plaintiffs' contention that the cause of action did not accrue until 
Wendy's acquired the property, the court concludes that the proper focus in a statute of 
limitations analysis is the time at which the cause of action accrued, not the identity of the parties 
5 
involved. See Utah Department of Environmental Quality v. Redd, 2002 UT 50 Tf 16 (citing 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-1). 
6. The same analysis applies to plaintiffs1 claims for breach of contract with respect to 
the Drive Through Facilities and signage. 
7. Inasmuch as the Declaration is a written contract, a six year statute of limitation 
applies to actions for breach of contract under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2). 
8 • Both breaches of the Declaration plaintiffs allege occurred well over six years 
before this action was commenced. 
9. Although the Declaration generally forbids the construction of improvements on 
common areas, it expressly authorizes Drive Through Facilities located on Parcel Three as 
shown on the Plot Plan. 
10. The Drive Through Facilities are consequently excepted from the Declaration's 
general prohibition of improvements on the Common Area and are, in fact, expressly permitted. 
11. Because the Drive Through Facilities are expressly permitted by the Declaration, 
Wendy's is entitled to a declaratory judgment decreeing that the Drive Through Facilities may 
remain in use in their present location and configuration. 
12. The court further rejects plaintiffs' contention that the Declaration prohibits 
Wendy's from maintaining Menu Board Signs. 
13. The Declaration prohibits any "pylon, monument or other free-standing sign" on 
Parcel Three in addition to the pair of free standing signs expressly permitted thereby. The 
Declaration, however, does not prohibit Menu Board Signs. 
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14. Moreover, the Declaration expressly contemplates and permits the operation of a 
drive through restaurant on Parcel Three. Signage like Menu Board Signs is an inherently 
necessary feature of modern drive through restaurants. 
15. Wendy's is entitled to a declaratory judgment decreeing that the Menu Board Signs 
may remain in use in their present location and configuration. 
16. Wendy's is further entitled to an order enjoining plaintiffs from taking any action to 
inhibit Wendy's from using and maintaining the Drive Through Facilities and Menu Board Signs 
in their present location and configuration. 
17. Because Wendy's is the prevailing party, Wendy's is entitled to an award of its 
& 
costs and attorney fees. Based on the Affidavit of Ronald G. Russell, the court concludes that a 
reasonable attorney fee in this action is $ ltd' and that Wendy's is entitled to an 
award of its costs totaling $ 
DATED this /ZZr^y °f m4i-,. 2006 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Michael Z. Hayes, Esq. 
Todd J. Godfrey, Esq. of 
MAZURAN & HAYES 
Attopflteys for Plaint 
RonahsDur. Kussell, Esq. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / * * day of January, 2006 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, postage prepaid, 
to: 
Michael Z. Hayes, Esq. 
Todd J. Godfrey, Esq. 
MAZURAN & HAYES 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124-1725 
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MAGE FILES 2S37RICT COURT Third Judicial District 
MAR 2 I 2006 
By. 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019
 q Y 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 ENTERED !N P - £ ^ ' HY 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 OF JUDC 
DATE 
SALT LAKE£OUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS 
ENTERPRISES, L.C.; and WHITE 
INVESTMENT CO., INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED 
HAMBURGERS OF NEW YORK, INC., 
Defendant. 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 040915948PR 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
The court having issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and for the reasons 
set forth therein, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and all causes of action therein be and the same is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits, for no cause of action. 
2. The court grants judgment in favor of defendant on its Counterclaim as follows: 
Final Judgment @J 
